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The Role of Western Democratic System of Governance in 
Exacerbating Ethnic Conflicts in Africa: The Case of Ghana’s 
Democratic Dispensation, 1992-2012 
 
David Kwasi Bansah 
Kennesaw State University 
 
This paper interrogates the influence of Western forms of democracy on ethnic conflicts in Africa through a case study 
of Ghana’s adoption of multiparty democracy between 1992 and 2012. It discusses the transition of African traditional 
systems of government before, during, and after colonization. The paper also shows how democracy, by definition 
and in terms of governance, cannot solely be a Western idea since many African societies had democratic elements in 
their systems of government before the arrival of the Europeans. Relying on qualitative secondary data, and the 
analysis of fierce and acrimonious competition that have characterized multiparty democratic elections in post-
independence Ghana as case study, the paper inquires if there is any relationship between ethnic rivalries and conflicts 
in many African states and the Western-style democratic system. 




It has been argued that democratic system of 
governance is a Western imposition on African states 
(Fukuyama, 1989; and Nwauwa, 2003). Prior to the 
partition of Africa, many parts of the continent had 
empires. While these empires were governed by 
traditional rulers based on the concept of kingship, 
other smaller groupings had their unique system of 
governance without chiefs or kings as their rulers 
(Uchendu, 1965). Both centralized and acephalous 
societies had ethnic and clan divisions, which 
evolved functional conflict management strategies. 
This made the incidence of deadly conflicts a rare 
phenomenon, particularly when compared to the 
rampant and bloody conflicts that has been visible in 
the postcolonial African states, as those conflict 
management strategies enabled those precolonial 
societies to prevent disputes and conflicts from 
degenerating into violence. To many, in addition to 
the arbitrary partitioning of the African continent 
without recourse to language, ethnicity, culture and 
religion, the imposition of Western forms of 
democracy is at the heart of most of the deadly 
conflicts that have been, and are being, fought in 
Africa (Ayittey, 1998; Boahen, 1989; Fukuyama, 
1989; Parsons, 2010; and Williams, 2011).  
 Using Ghana’s democratic dispensation between 
1992 and 2012 as a case study, this paper assesses the 
extent to which Western forms of democracy have 
contributed to the exacerbation of ethnic conflicts in 
Africa. The reason for choosing Ghana lies in the fact 
that the period 1992 to 2012 (i.e., twenty years) 
represents the longest period of Ghana’s attempt at 
democracy without interruption since her 
independence from British colonial rule in 1957. The 
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paper specifically poses the question: To what extent 
does Western democratic system of governance help 
to explain or account for ethnic-based conflicts in 
contemporary Ghanaian politics? 
 The paper is organized as follows. The first 
section highlights the general historical background 
of Africa’s governance, from the pre-colonial to the 
post-colonial periods. The second section gives 
account of how democratic transition impacts ethnic 
conflicts. In the third section, Ghana’s attempt at 
democratic governance immediately after 
independence from British rule in 1957 is assessed. 
The forth section discusses the ethnic factor in 
Ghana’s body politic, focusing on multiparty 
democratic elections between 1992 and 2012. Based 
on the evidence from various perspectives, the paper 
concludes by stressing the complicity of the Western 
form of democracy in exacerbating ethnic conflicts 
in Ghana, and by extension Africa and suggests 
possible ways of improving multiparty democratic 
elections in order that they do not degenerate into 
ethnic violence. 
 




Irrespective of how it is defined, democracy is 
expected to promote the rule of law and good 
governance—in terms of accountability, legitimacy, 
and transparency. This is because, in democracies, 
the citizens are considered the sovereign as they 
freely choose their representatives and replace them 
when they see fit through competitive elections. This 
enables them to participate (albeit indirectly) in the 
making of decisions that affect their lives. 
Democracies also have built-in institutional checks 
and balances, including the law courts that enable 
political differences to be settled authoritatively. 
When these institutions function as designed, there is 
a reduction in the chances for violence or wars. 
Democratic states are also expected to be at peace 
with one another, so long as they maintain the 
democratic ideals. Hence, scholars of “democratic 
peace” school of thought suggest democratization as 
a pre-condition for good governance that rest on rule 
of law and respect for human rights (Russet, 1993).  
 However, in spite of its conflict management 
potentials the process of change from an 
authoritarian regime to democracy can be quite 
challenging as most transitional countries often lack 
the robust institutional frameworks that functional 
democracies necessitate. In such contexts 
democratization itself can be a prime source of ethnic 
conflicts and wars (Tilly, 2000). In contemporary 
Africa, the odds of colonial “divide and rule” system, 
and post-colonial political developments or even the 
dynamics of globalization, have played major roles 
in instigating conflicts, especially among ethnic 
groups. This is because the institutional capacity of 
most African states is usually weak prior to 
democratization. 
 According to Gill (2000, p. 2), although several 
theoretical dimensions exist on the subject, they all 
converge at the point where answers are solicited for 
the question: “how does democracy come about and 
what makes it endure?” Three main elements are 
identified by Bunce (2003), cited by Vorrath and 
Krebs (2009) as central to a successful and peaceful 
democratic transitions. According to him: 
 the national and the state question need to be 
settled;  
 the rules of the transition and the new 
political order are the result of bargaining 
between a small group of the autocratic elites 
and the small group of representatives of the 
democratic opposition; and 
 the co-operation of the authoritarians can be 
secured through co-optation. Thus, 
transitions are essentially a compromise 
between the old and the new elites. 
 Regarding the first point, Rustow (1970) stresses 
the importance of a consensus on national identity 
prior to democratization. Others such as Huntington 
(1968), and Linz and Stephen (1996) argue that a 
legitimate and viable order has to be established first 
before any democratic transition. Reemphasizing the 
interaction between state-building and 
democratization, Schmitter et al. (2005) write that “a 
capable state is not only seen as a precondition for 
successful democratization; democratization can 
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affect state capacity as well.” Similarly, Bratton and 
Chang (2006) contend that, mutually reinforcing 
process between state-building and regime 
consolidation can become a vicious cycle that may 
lead to state decay as the case of Democratic 
Republic of Congo shows.  
 What these studies tried to achieve is the 
demonstration that state-building and 
democratization cannot work in the same direction. 
In other words, a country stands a better chance in its 
democratization process when state institutions are 
built first. This implies that functioning state 
bureaucracy, rule of law, strong political institutions, 
etc., are necessary preconditions for any 
democratization process. In summary, therefore, 
scholars almost agree that where a transition takes 
place before the proper institutional foundations 
have been laid, democracy is likely to fail (Bunce, 
2003; Huntington, 1968; Linz and Stephen, 1996; 
Rustow, 1970; Schmitter et al., 2005; and Vorrath 
and Krebs, 2009).  
 In countries where the national and the state 
questions have not been settled as well as the non-
existence of viable and legitimate institutional order, 
democracy or any democratization process is bound 
to face challenges which, more often than not, 
manifest along ethnic lines. Thus, it is not surprising 
that almost all African states suffer from these 
democratic transition pitfalls to the extent that some 
scholars call for the identification of appropriate 
political institutions that are capable of 
accommodating different groups, rather than the 
“idealized” condition for democratization. In the 
midst of the dilemma, however, the perceived failure 
of “democracy” raises the question as to why pre-
colonial African system of government seemed to 
have done a better job of apprehending and managing 
ethnic cleavages than post-colonial democratic 
regimes.  
 In an attempt to answer the above question, 
examples of some traditional African regimes are 
cited for the sake of comparison. Not only did these 
African governments exhibit democratic tendencies, 
they actually followed well-structured systems of 
rules and laws that encouraged ethnic cohesion. For 
instance, in their comparative analysis of the Akan 
(Ghana) and Yoruba (Nigeria) models of traditional 
governance Adjei and Adebayo (2014, p. 92), 
highlight the traditional conflict adjudication 
mechanisms predicated mainly on reconciliation 
instead of judicial or court adjudication systems 
based on winner-takes-all or zero-sum game 
syndrome. More evidences exist on the capabilities 
of African precolonial governments in soothing 
ethnic cleavages. To further lay the foundation for 
this argument, the paper now shifts its attention to the 
precolonial systems of governance in Africa.   
 
PRE-COLONIAL AFRICAN SYSTEM OF 
GOVERNMENT AND ETHNICITY 
 
Prior to the arrival of the European colonial powers, 
African societies had their own forms of 
government. Most of these systems were based on 
empires, and every society had a set of rules, laws, 
traditions, and customs. These empires were, in 
many regards, similar to kingdoms and empires in 
Asia and Europe at the same time (Boahen, 1989; and 
Parsons, 2010). The king and his councilors and 
advisors carried out executive, legislative, and 
judicial functions, but in a few instances there were 
separations of powers.  
 Secondly, just as was true in Europe, Asia, and 
the Americas, not all African people lived in large 
kingdoms. There were smaller centralized political 
units called “city states” made up of quite large urban 
or semi-urban areas. While these shared much in 
common with customs that existed within the larger 
African kingdoms, the primary difference here was 
in terms of size (e.g. Old Oyo, Ife, Ilorin, and Ibadan 
of West Africa; Sofala, Kilwa, Mombasa, and Lamu 
of East Africa). The third political system were the 
“decentralized,” “acephalous,” or “stateless” 
political societies. Most of these societies, in addition 
to not having kings, chiefs or ruling elites, were often 
made up of neighboring towns and villages that had 
no political connections with a larger kingdom or 
nation, but were governed by councils of elders. In 
all these, the argument has been whether the concept 
of democratic governance is exclusively a Western 
concept of which African societies now stand 
desperately in need of. According to Nwauwa 
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(2003), before the contact and subsequent 
colonization, Africans practiced some variants of 
democracy alongside authoritarian rule. 
Unfortunately, Europeans came to undermine this 
traditional participatory democratic system for 
almost one hundred years, only to revive it on the eve 
of decolonization in the form of a parliamentary 
system (Ayittey, 1998). Similarly, Adu Boahen 
(1989, p. 23) posits that “On all fronts—economic, 
political, social, and even intellectual—Africa was in 
the mood of change and revolution, accepting new 
challenges, showing ability at adaptation and 
modification, fighting back racist doctrines, and 
above all changing its economy and politics to suite 
socioeconomic realities of the day.” These facts, 
serve as counter measures to the notion that the 
continent of Africa and its people were primitive, 
static or undemocratic as the Western colonizers 
wanted the world to believe.  
 Thus, the literature attests that, in the period 
preceding colonial rule, Africa’s political 
experimentation ranges from direct and 
representative democracy to various forms of 
monarchical and decentralized systems (Evans-
Pritchard, 1940; Mair, 1974; Murdock, 1959; 
Nwauwa, 2003; and Owusu, 1997). Specifically, 
many writers on the democratic credentials of pre-
colonial Africa cite the indigenous political system 
of the Igbo of southeastern Nigeria and the Ashanti 
of Ghana, as elaborate examples of direct and 
participatory democracy in traditional Africa. One of 
such writers, Victor Uchendu (1965), isolated two 
layers of political structures among the Igbo: the 
village and the village-group. According to him and 
few others, it was at the village level that democracy 
could best be observed. During general assembly, 
every male adult directly participated in the 
legislative and decision-making process pertaining to 
public affairs. In the same vein women had their own 
assemblies where social matters were discussed in 
the open for which dissenting views were largely 
accommodated (Achebe, 1958; Maillu, 1997; 
Nwabara, 1977; and Uchendu, 1965). 
 
 
HOW COLONIALISM DISTORTED AFRICA’S 
TRADITIONAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE 
 
After the imposition of colonial rule, the entire 
African culture and traditional governance structures 
were besieged by Europeans who had ulterior 
motives. Governors who were appointed to rule the 
colonies had their mandate from metropolitan 
European capitals. Being military officers or career 
public servants, these governors had little or no 
regard for Africans and their government structures. 
Instead, they suppressed the African people through 
the use of their colonial army and police who only 
understood the language of “pure force.” Thus, 
several historians describe the colonial 
administrators’ style of governance as oppressive, 
dictatorial, and sometimes barbaric (Acemoglu et al., 
2001; Boahen, 1989; Nwauwu, 2003; and Parson, 
2010). Almost unanimously, these authors were 
convinced that since the colonial administrators 
owed their loyalty to those who appointed them, they 
became dictatorial, ruling by decrees and 
incarcerating Africans without due process of law.  
 Due to the high-handedness of colonial 
administration, pockets of resistance began to 
emerge in many parts of Africa. As a result, the 
colonial governors resorted to the use of “Indirect 
Rule” system where African traditional rulers were 
manipulated and used to achieve imperialist goals. 
Consequently, chiefs and other elites who were 
prepared to demean their status as stooges or “errand 
boys” were used against their own African people. 
Those who stood firm and challenged the colonial 
system, had their traditional titles removed to the 
extent that some were forced into exile. In the case 
of Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast), for instance, 
when it became clear that the Asantehene (King) 
Agyeman Prempeh I was not accepting the 
governor’s directives, he was captured in 1896 and 
sent to exile in the Seychelles (Boahen, 1989; Gareth, 
1998; Tordoff, 1965; and Hopkins, 1999). 
 In acephalous states, several colonial chiefs 
referred to as “warrant chiefs” were installed and 
imposed on the people by the colonial governors. 
This subversive attitude of colonial rule, 
incidentally, was carried over to the postcolonial era. 
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The system ran counter both to the African 
precolonial political systems as well as the 
postcolonial constitutional democracies.  
 
THE EFFECT OF COLONIAL RULE ON POST-
INDEPENDENT AFRICA 
 
 As noted by Nwauwa (2003), the wanton 
brutality and dictatorship that characterized colonial 
regimes were carried forward by many African 
nationalists who were at the helm after 
independence. Such leaders included Ghana’s 
Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Kenneth 
Kaunda of Zambia, and Jomo Kenyatta/Arap Moi of 
Kenya. Similar to colonial governors, these African 
leaders after taking over government became high-
handed in dealing with their people. They ruled 
beyond the reach of accountability, or what Ayittey 
describes as “sultanism” whereby freedom of 
expression was curtailed. This brought the 
emergence of one-party state that created a breeding 
ground for ambitious, corrupt, and dictatorial 
African leaders some of whom later surfaced in 
military uniforms. For these reasons, many historians 
including Basil Davidson think that “African states 
inherited dictatorship and not democracy” (Boahen, 
1989; Ayittey, 1998; Davidson, 1992; Nwauwa, 
2003; Owusu, 1997; and Sklar, 1983). 
 Consequently, there have been several calls to the 
effect that this dominant way of disguising 
democracy to achieve parochial interest must be 
revisited. For instance, Joseph (1997, p. 365) argues 
that “democracy must be expanded into a broader 
conceptualization” just as Makinda (1996, p. 557) 
thinks that “democracy should be conceived as a way 
of government firmly rooted in the belief that people 
in any society should be free to determine their 
political, economic, social, and cultural systems.” 
For David Maillu (1997, p. 255), “a broader concept 
of democracy should include cultural definition in 
which African democracy like philosophy had to be 
lived, theories aside.” He thinks that “African 
societies were socially and politically structured such 
that everybody participated according to his ability, 
ages-status, and wishes” (Maillu, 1997, p.255; see 
also Joseph, 1997; and Makinda, 1996). One can ask: 
Why did African leaders allow this inherited, 
distorted version of democracy to persist?. The next 
section deliberates on some of these reasons using 





Many states in Africa experienced frequent regime 
changes soon after independence. Continued 
economic scarcity coupled with the interplay of 
political forces left little doubt in analysts’ mind that 
instability and ethnic upheaval was going to shape 
the post-colonial future of many African countries 
(Davidson, 1992). Ghana had its share of this 
prediction when, after her independence in 1957, the 
country witnessed a system that was geared towards 
increased state control. Initially under its first leader, 
Kwame Nkrumah, deliberate attempt was made to 
establish majoritarian democracy which later 
transformed into a kind of hegemonic control. 
Rothchild’s narrative portrays Ghana’s post-colonial 
regime as “periodic shifts from polyarchy, hegemony 
control, military autocracy to democracy” (Rothchild 
1997, p. 18).  
 To make matters worse, a military take-over in 
1972 changed the political terrain of Kwame 
Nkrumah’s majoritarian democracy/hegemonic 
control to military autocracy under General Kutu 
Acheampong and at some point military-populism 
under Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings from 
1981 to 1992. Rawlings’ regime, which by 1983 
could be described as a classical form of bureaucratic 
centralism due to its military cum civilian 
composition, experienced several domestic public 
agitations for political reforms. Amidst international 
pressure, the regime had no choice but to organize 
democratic elections in 1992 based on a new national 
constitution. Since then, although sometimes 
witnesses some level of political turbulence, Ghana 
has been making efforts to strengthen multiparty 
democracy and general elections have been held 
every four years.  
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THE ETHNIC FACTOR IN GHANA’S GENERAL 
ELECTIONS 1992-2012 
 
The ethnic dimension to voting patterns during 
Ghana’s current 4th Republican Constitution (1992 
Constitution) has its prelude from the general 
political atmosphere before and immediately after 
independence in 1957. After independence, Ghana’s 
modern state formation based on its centralized 
governance structures coupled with the colonial 
legacy began to receive various forms of ethnic 
responses. Political parties that contested Ghana’s 
first election in 1956 included the Northern People’s 
Party (NPP), Togoland Congress (TC), the 
Convention People’s Party (CPP), and the National 
Liberation Movement (NLM). As their names sound, 
except for the CPP which tried to balance the ethnic 
card, the NPP was predominantly meant for ethnic 
groups located in the northern part of Ghana, TC was 
for the Ewes in the Trans Volta Togoland, and the 
NLM was dominated by the Akans. Unfortunately, 
the expectations of the ethnic-colored parties were 
not meet. While the CPP won seventy-one (71) seats, 
the NPP, TCP, and NLM won fifteen (15), twelve 
(12), and two (2) respectively. In addition to the 
physical clashes, arson and violence that 
characterized the electoral process, there was clear 
evidence to the effect that “tribal” politics had little 
impact in Ghana’s democratization process.  
 This notwithstanding, there have been some 
deliberate efforts by political elites to cash-in on the 
blurry ethnic divisions in Ghana mostly for parochial 
interests. Consequently, the nation’s elections have 
followed ethnic lines but with a kind of staggered 
trend over the years. This scenario encompasses the 
politics since 1992 involving the two vibrant political 
parties: The National Democratic Congress (NDC) 
and New Patriotic Party (NPP). Table 1 depicts the 
regional (ethnic) voting trend between these two 
vibrant parties, NDC and NPP, between 1992 and 
2012.  
 In this period, a total of six (6) general elections 
were held in Ghana. The 1992, 1996, and 2000 
elections indicate reasonable ethnic trends, 
particularly between the regions of Volta and 
Ashanti. While landslide votes were recorded by the 
National Democratic Congress (NDC) in the Volta 
region under the leadership of Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings 
(Rtd.) on the basis of his ethnic lineage, his 
counterpart Professor Albert Adu Boahen of New 
Patriotic Party (NPP) had massive votes from his 
native region, Ashanti. In spite of the fact that this 
trend continued in all subsequent elections, their 
magnitude continue to change which political 
analysts claim are results of presidential candidates’ 
personality factors (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 
2004; Senaya, 2008).  
 It is worth noting that the personality factor 
seemed to have worked positively such that 
government has changed hands three consecutive 
times between the two dominant parties of NDC and 
NPP in spite of their labels as Ewe and Ashanti 
parties respectively. Thus, the NPP took over for two 
terms (2000 and 2004) after the NDC’s initial first 
two terms (1992 and 1996). The baton again changed 
back to the NDC in 2008 which won its second term 
in 2012. Suggestively, voter education is gradually 
shifting towards “issue-based” rather than “ethnic-
based” politics in Ghana, thus, a sign of good 
democratization process. One of the instances that 
supports the idea that voters are shifting away from 
ethnic lines was the example of 2008 general 
elections. The winner of the 2008 election, Prof. 
Attah Mills, a Fante (Akan) from the Central region, 
who stood on the ticket of the NDC party labeled as 
Ewe party, won an overwhelming majority vote from 
the Volta (Ewe) region compared to his region Akan 
homeland. As shown by Ghana’s political map (see 
Figure 1), the Akan ethnic group comprise mainly of 
Ashanti, Eastern, Central, Brong Ahafo and Western 
regions. Per the Electoral Commission of Ghana 
(2008) results in Table 2, Prof. Attah Mills did far 
better in the Ewe speaking region (82.88% in Volta) 
than his home region (50.58% in Central).  
 
THE LIABILITY OF WESTERN FORMS OF 
DEMOCRACY FOR ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN 
GHANA AND ELSEWHERE 
 
The African traditional system of government as has 
been alluded to earlier in this paper precipitated on 
the concept of majoritarian inclusiveness. Even 
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without the incorporation of multiparty elections as 
is the case today, African societies were able to 
choose their leaders and lived in harmony. 
Convincingly, it appeared that citizens at the time 
were more concerned with their role in decision-
making processes rather than how their leaders were 
selected. The wisdom behind this line of thinking 
stemmed from the fact that traditional leaders were 
seen more or less as “figure heads” who upheld the 
internal decision-making control measures on all 
major issues that affected the larger group. Thus, 
even though the method of selecting traditional 
leaders may be considered to lack transparency, 
limited to only few elders and kingmakers, 
considerable “behind the scenes” consultations 
involving clan and family heads characterized the 
selection process. Thus, if one has the option to 
compare post-independence democratic multiparty 
system of government with that of traditional system 
of government in terms of their conflict control 
mechanisms, it may suffice to conclude that 
multiparty democracy has been more ethnically 
conflict prone. Over time, most multiparty elections 
have been fiercely contested because of the “winner-
takes-all” policy that goes with it. In other words, 
ethnic clusters in a particular state have everything to 
lose if a contestant from their origin fails to win in an 
election. Considering the many civil wars Africa has 
witnessed in recent memory, multiparty democratic 
elections’ complicity in orchestrating ethnic violence 
cannot be in doubt. Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kenya, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Rwanda, North and South Sudan, 
Zimbabwe, and Nigeria are but a few examples 
where civil wars were the direct result of election 
disagreements.  
 In Liberia for instance, what one might call a 
prelude to the civil war started when Samuel Doe’s 
Krahn ethnic group was politically marginalized 
against the Gio, Mandingo and Mano ethnic groups 
who were loyal to the opposition leader, Charles 
Taylor (Ellis, 1999). Similarly, Cote d’Ivoire’s 
situation presented Laurent Gbagbo’s southern 
ethnic groups’ devotion to maintain Gbagbo as the 
president even when it was obvious that he lost the 
election to Alassane Quattara in its 2010 multiparty 
democratic election. The result of this was a war 
between the ethnic groups belonging to the camps of 
these leaders with heinous civilian casualties. The 
stories remain the same for all the states listed above. 
What is worth noting in all these is how democracy 
as it is being practiced in Africa has nurtured ethnic 
conflicts that were not, hitherto, known in the 
affected regions. In other words the Western form of 
democracy has done more harm than good in terms 
of the escalating ethnic rivalries on the continent. 
But, can there be any good lessons to be learned from 
multiparty democracy as it is being practiced in the 
Western world? Based on the literature, the flipside 
also holds a good promise that when practiced with 
all the prerequisites in place, democracy can 
engender societal stability and development.  
 Contrary to these bad cases, in Ghana one may 
be right to suggest that the country has been able to 
escape violent ethnic conflicts largely because of 
some good governance and conflict management 
strategies enshrined in her political electioneering 
process. The 1992 Constitution of Ghana, besides 
guaranteeing the freedom of all citizens and the right 
to vote and be voted for in multiparty democratic 
elections, also put in place several other practical 
conflict management mechanisms. In its 2014 
governance assessment report, the World Bank 
describes Ghana as a country that continues to show 
good performance on domestic governance. The 
report specifically indicates among others, that 
Ghana has strong multi-party political system, 
growing media pluralism, and strong civil society 
activism (World Bank, 2014). Again, Asante and 
Gyima-Boadi (2004) commend Ghana’s 
constitutional democracy since 1992 in their study on 
“Ethnic Structures, Inequality and Governance of the 
Public Sector in Ghana.” Part of their findings asserts 
that “although ethnic rivalries and jealousies exist 
among certain ethnic groups which sometimes foster 
conflicts, Ghana’s governance institutions and public 
policies have been generally sensitive to the complex 
challenges presented by the heterogeneous nature of 
the society” (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004, p. 
135). 
 It is interesting to note that in spite of the fact that 
Ghana’s electoral rules appear to have been on the 
majoritarian “winner-takes-all” model, there is also 
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adequate safeguards that protect the minority group 
that do not vote for the winning party. Thus, the 
formula for sharing the “national cake” is based on 
fairness and needs instead of on an ethnic group’s 
loyalty to a regime. For example, between 1992 and 
2000 during President Rawlings’ regime under NDC 
(Ewe dominated party), the Ashanti region where the 
NDC’s least votes came from was reported to have 
received the largest chunk of development projects 
(Andre and Meple-Somps, 2006). One of the reasons 
behind this is the fact that beyond the pursuance of 
its electoral mandate, the government needs a 
peaceful country to govern. Thus, paying attention to 
the losers of an election is a clever way of controlling 
electoral related conflicts in an ethnically divided 
society. Again, Ghana’s constitutions since 
independence have entrenched the “avoidance of 
discrimination act” where governments over the 
years are mandated to share resources fairly 
irrespective of ethnic voting trends [Article 35 (1) of 
1969; Article 42 (5) of 1979; and Article 55 (4) of 
1992]. 
 Additionally, other non-constitutional provisions 
on election matters have also received popularity 
within the Ghanaian society over the years. Viewed 
as a conflict management tool, prior to its 2012 
general elections, all contestants or candidates were 
assembled before prominent traditional rulers to take 
an oath that they would abide by the election result. 
On top of all these, the sensitivity of Ghanaians 
including political elites to seek the “rule of law” in 
solving conflicts cannot be over emphasized. 
Ghana’s decision to use the court system to deal with 
her recent (2012) presidential election dispute was 




In this paper four main tasks have been attempted. 
The paper tried to narrate the way Africans governed 
themselves before the arrival of Europeans and how 
colonization truncated its progress. The myth 
surrounding the white-man’s notion as the exclusive 
originator of democratic concept has been explained. 
The paper also exposes the sense in which African 
states transitioned into post-independence 
governance and how the challenges created by 
colonial rule, including ethnic conflicts, are being 
positively dealt with, using Ghana as a case. Finally, 
the paper provided some good thoughts on conflict 
management mechanisms that may be necessary for 
democratic governance to thrive in Africa such that 
the current spate of post-election ethnic conflicts 
may be minimized.  
 It is made clear through the discussions that the 
colonial governors took advantage of the 
vulnerability of the African people by using their 
own traditional system to perpetrate their agenda 
through “divide and rule.” In so doing, the structures 
of political, economic, social, and cultural 
development in Africa were distorted. On the 
question of whether democratic strand in governance 
was a Western idea, the historical analyses based on 
several intellectual perspectives asserted that the 
concept of democracy in Africa could first be traced 
to African traditional regimes. In fact, the example of 
Igbo of southeastern Nigeria, among many others, is 
cited as well-structured democracies prevailing in 
Africa prior to colonial rule. European colonialists 
ignored these democratic governance structures; 
instead, they imposed autocratic colonial rule on the 
people As independence loomed, the last batch of 
colonial governors tried desperately to now impose 
“democracy” which came little too late. The 
question, then, is: Assuming African societies were 
allowed to continue with their precolonial way of 
selecting leaders, would ethnic conflicts have been 
minimal? 
 Linking the argument to the case under 
consideration, the discussions has shown the extent 
to which Ghana, for instance, has struggled (and still 
struggles) to bring back the good old days of 
traditional governance, which significantly ensured 
political, economic, social, and cultural cohesion 
among ethnic groups. In the aftermath of 
colonialism, the attempt to institute democracy was 
faced with conflicts, most of which had ethnic 
undertones. Democracy, in Western context, has 
been the creator or escalator of new ethnic conflicts, 
especially given the rate at which civil wars result 
from multiparty democratic elections in Africa. On 
the other hand based on Ghana’s example, it is also 
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fair to conclude that democracy per se cannot be 
blamed for ethnic rivalries in African societies. 
Rather, democratic system of governance, if 
practiced in the context of the local culture of the 
people can bring about peace.  
 The fact that Ghana has not experienced any full-
scale ethnic conflict as we have seen in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Cote d’Ivoire suggests 
that strengthening democracy through multi-party 
elections based on rule of law, press freedom, 
pluralism, strong civil society, fair distribution of 
state resources, etc., the future could be bright for 
Africa. Specifically, it is my recommendation that it 
is about time African nations put the colonial past 
behind them and work towards building good 
governance structures that minimizes corruption and 






Table 1: Ashanti and Volta Regional Presidential Election Results between NDC & NPP (%) 
 
Region/Year/ 1996 
NDC    NPP 
2000 
NDC    NPP 
2004 
NDC    NPP 
2008 
NDC    NPP 
2012 
NDC    NPP 
Ashanti 32.87   60.54 20.11   79.89 24.06   74.61 25.01   74.99 *N/A     *N/A 
Volta 93.24   3.61 88.47   11.53 83.83   14.26 86.06    13.94 *N/A     *N/A 
 
Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana’s website (www.ec.gov.gh). *Figures not displayed at the time of writing this paper. 
 
 
Table 2: 2008 Presidential Election Regional Percentage Votes Won by Professor Attah Mills, Candidate for NDC 
 
Region Ashanti B/A Central Eastern G/A Northern U/E U/W Volta Western 
Vote (%) 26.13 47.70 50.58 41.10 52.11 56.84 56.06 54.36 82.88 47.06 
 
Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana’s official website (www.ec.gov.gh)  
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